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Facets of French Heritage: Selling the Crown Jewels in
the Early Third Republic*
Tom Stammers
Durham University
The construction of a national heritage in France has often been described in
heroic tones. It was built around a series of critical legislative milestones, from
the campaign against vandalism launched byAbbéGrégoire in the 1790s, through
thework of the Commission desMonuments Historiques from the 1830s, and cul-
minating in the protection of urban ensembles provided under the loi Malraux
(named after the minister who did so much to popularize the noun patrimoine
in the 1960s).1 According to this story of progressive enlightenment, France be-
came the laboratory for heritage initiatives in response to the shock of 1789. In
its desire to smash outworn institutions and relocate authority not in historic pre-
cedent but in the immutable laws of nature and human reason, the French Revo-
lution succeeded in making the preservation of the past an urgent political conun-
drum. Just as the creation of the Louvre has been hailed as the birth of modern
museology, so too the bureaucratic instruments devised for sifting and inventory-
ing objects reappropriated from the crown, the church, and the émigrés have been
acclaimed for placing the postrevolutionary heritage on a scientiﬁc footing.2 Dur-
ing “le moment Guizot” in the 1830s, the task of conservation was increasingly
professionalized, awarded to bourgeois capacités, such as scholars and architects,
* Earlier versions of this article were presented to the nineteenth-century history seminar
in Oxford, the Crises research group at Montpellier, the annual conference of the Society
for the Study of French History, and the seminar on the history of collecting at the Wal-
lace Collection. I am grateful to the organizers and audiences at these events for their en-
couragement and helpful feedback. The piece was written while I was the Deakin Fellow
afﬁliated with the Maison Française and the European Studies Centre in Oxford, and I deeply
appreciate the support of both institutions. I have also beneﬁted from the comments of
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1 André Chastel and Jean-Pierre Babelon, “La notion de patrimoine,” Revue de l’Art
49 (1980): 5–32; Françoise Choay, “Le patrimoine en questions,” Esprit 359 (2009):
194–222.
2 Dominique Poulot, Musée, nation, patrimoine: 1789–1815 (Paris, 1997); Andrew
McClellan, Inventing the Louvre: Art, Politics and the Origin of the Modern Museum in
Eighteenth-Century Paris (Berkeley, 1994).
who worked to document and restore monuments deemed to be exemplary.3 The
result was a philosophy of conservation at once didactic and elitist, technical and
state regulated, nourished on an idea of French exceptionalism.
Yet this account of the consolidation of French heritage has come under ﬁre
for both its celebratory mood and its empirical omissions. Architectural histo-
rian Jean-Michel Leniaud has dismissed the argument that the French notion of
heritage dates from the revolutionary rupture, instead highlighting the slow
growth of the concept of collective property over the longue durée. Collective
understandings of patrimony already circulated under the old regime, grounded
in family law or the inalienable goods of the church; to that extent Leniaud has
tried to recuperate the original meaning of patrimoine from the Roman term
patrimonium, linked to the juridical transmission of property across genera-
tions.4 His argument tallies with the enduring power of familial metaphors in
the discourse of national heritage, analogized to heirlooms, relics, or bequests.
In his critique of the suffocating Jacobin state, however, Leniaud underesti-
mates the vitality of those nineteenth-century subcultures that dissented from
centralized initiatives, including royalist notables, regionalist societies, and re-
ligious groups.5 Fine studies of nineteenth-century historicism have stressed the
complex dialogue between amateurs and professionals, Paris and the prov-
inces, the market and the museum, secular and confessional priorities.6 After
1870, the republicans were obliged to work with a number of curators, critics,
collectors, and dealers whose sympathy for the new regime was uncertain. Far
from being monopolized by the state and its agents, the protection of French
heritage involved a coalition of fractious interest groups within civil society,
which successive governments struggled to coordinate around any consensual
vision. It took years of wooing aristocrats and collectors by republican admin-
istrators, for instance, to institutionalize the rococo and enshrine it “as a legit-
imate part of the national cultural trust.”7
Despite its antimodern animus and nostalgic sentiments, the protection of cul-
tural property has rightly been viewed as a corollary of modernization. Accord-
3 Dominique Poulot, “The Birth of Heritage: Le moment Guizot,” Oxford Art Jour-
nal 11, no. 2 (1988): 40–56; see also Françoise Bercé, Les premiers travaux de la Com-
mission des Monuments historiques 1837–48: Procès-verbaux et relevés d’architectes
(Paris, 1979).
4 Jean-Michel Leniaud, Les archipels du passé: Le patrimoine et son histoire (Paris,
2002).
5 Stephane Gerson, The Pride of Place: Local Memories and Political Culture in
Nineteenth-Century France (New York, 2003); Odile Parsis-Barubé, La province anti-
quaire: L’invention de l’histoire locale en France (1800–1870) (Paris, 2011).
6 Kevin Murphy, Memory and Modernity: Viollet-le-Duc at Vézelay (Philadelphia,
2000).
7 Deborah Silverman, Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology,
Style (Berkeley, 1992), 142.
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ing to Paul Betts and Corey Ross, “the obsession with heritage reﬂected the need
to engineer a form of historical consciousness geared toward a modern world of
rationality and technology and to circumscribe an appropriate place for it.”8 The
patrimoine offered a mechanism by which key stakeholders, the Church and
the aristocracy, could be bound into the Third Republic, even if they ﬁercely de-
fended their own forms of historical consciousness. Astrid Swenson has argued
that this adaptation and integration of elites was happening in parallel across Eu-
rope by the later nineteenth century because heritage had come to function “as a
yardstick for a people’s cultural attainment.”9 Displaying due care for cultural
patrimony was not just a strategy in nation building but also a matter of interna-
tional standing—especially when this patrimony was potentially imperiled by
the forces of democracy, industrialism, and the globalized art market. The per-
ceived need to defend the nation’s treasures against outside predators politicized
auctions in the later nineteenth century. Tournaments of values, the dramatic
scenes that played out in the salesrooms of Paris, were crucial not just for expos-
ing the numeric and symbolic currency of different national brands but also for
extending the Great Powers’ competition to annex the spoils of civilization.10
How these dynamic contexts interacted can be grasped through a focus on
one exceptional event: in May 1887, after two decades of wrangling, a large
portion of France’s crown jewels were sold at auction. While the origin of the
royal regalia dates back to the eighth century, the joyaux de la couronne had
been permanently established in the sixteenth century and endowed by succes-
sive generations of monarchs who had drawn on them as ceremonial attire, dip-
lomatic gifts, or ﬁscal assets in times of crisis. Housed under Louis XIV in the
Garde-Meuble, the collection was inventoried as national property in 1791. Sto-
len under mysterious circumstances the following year, the collection was reas-
sembled and expanded under Napoleon and achieved a new public prominence
in the Second Empire. The decision to part with the jewels in 1887 continues to
arouse indignation, and the foremost historian of the collection, Bernard Morel,
has narrated the litany of blunders that dogged each stage of the sale proceedings.11
Daniel Alcouffe, former curator of decorative arts at the Louvre, denounced a
policy that “dramatically amputated the national heritage. . . . Financially disap-
8 Paul Betts and Corey Ross, “Modern Historical Preservation—Towards a Global
Perspective,” Past and Present 226, suppl. 10 (2015): 14.
9 Astrid Swenson, The Rise of Heritage: Preserving the Past in Germany, France
and England (Cambridge, 2013), 273, 276.
10 For essays on the emulative competition between nineteenth-century institutions,
see Bénédicte Savoy and Andrea Meyer, eds., The Museum Is Open: Towards a Trans-
national History of Museums, 1750–1940 (Berlin, 2014).
11 Bernard Morel, Les joyaux de la couronne de France: Les objets du sacre des rois
et des reines suivis de l’histoire des joyaux de la couronne de Francois Ier à nos jours
(Paris, 1988), 369–77.
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pointing, the sale was disastrous with regard to history, with regard to mineral-
ogy, considering the quality of stones which no longer exist, and with regard
to the arts, with somanymasterpieces of French jewelry disappearing at the same
time.”12 Since the SecondWorld War, Louvre curators such as Pierre Verlet tried
whenever possible to reacquire these dispersed treasures, so that by 1989 the
Galérie d’Apollon could display with pride the fabled Sancy diamond (missing
since the Revolution), the parure of Marie-Amélie (bought from the comte de
Paris), and the tiara of Empress Eugénie.13
Without seeking to reprise the debate about the wisdom of the sale, the aim
here is to study what it reveals about the value assigned to royal heritage during
the consolidation of the Third Republic. Precious stones with glamorous prov-
enances commanded immense prestige in the nineteenth century. Parisian gold-
smiths such as Alfred André specialized in mounting Renaissance jewels in or-
der to satisfy the demand for pieces that combined luxury craftsmanship and
romantic associations.14 Yet, beyond their aesthetic appeal, the crown jewels
were also the symbolic apparel of power. British historians have demonstrated
how the acquisition and adaptation of trophies such as the Koh-i-Noor diamond
can illuminate national and imperial identities.15 Intimate, tactile, seemingly in-
destructible, the crown jewels were cherished as emanations or crystallizations
of the sovereigns whose bodies they adorned. In contrast to the familiar link be-
tween patrimoine, architecture, and urbanism, the crown jewels invite us to con-
sider monuments on a miniature scale, items of “portable property” whose pos-
session was haunted by a pervasive fear of loss.16 The dismay caused by their
alienationwas exacerbated due to the sensitive timing of the sale, which coincided
with the antiparliamentary agitation of General Boulanger and the Schnaebele
affair that brought mutterings of another Franco-German war.17 Steeped in sym-
12 Daniel Alcouffe, “Une catastrophe nationale: La vente des diamants de la couronne
en 1887,” La Tribune de l’Art (2008), http://www.latribunedelart.com/une-catastrophe
-nationale-la-vente-des-diamants-de-la-couronne-en-1887. Unless otherwise noted, all trans-
lations aremy own.
13 Bernard Morel, “La vente des joyaux de la couronne en 1887,” in De Versailles à
Paris: Le destin des collections royales, ed. Jacques Charles (Paris, 1989),182; Daniel
Alcouffe, “Les collections d’objets d’art dans la galérie d’Apollon 1861–2004,” in La
Galérie d’Apollon au Palais du Louvre, ed. Généviève Bresc-Bautier (Paris, 2004),
213–16.
14 Philippa Plock, “Rothschilds, Rubies and Rogues: The ‘Renaissance’ Jewels of
Waddesdon Manor,” Journal of the History of Collections 29, no. 1 (2017): 143–60.
15 Danielle Kinsey, “Koh-i-Noor: Empire, Diamonds, and the Performance of British
Material Culture,” Journal of British Studies 48, no. 2 (2009): 391–419. See also Gra-
hame Clark, Symbols of Excellence: Precious Materials as Expressions of Status (Cam-
bridge, 1986), 82–106; Marcia Pointon, Brilliant Effects: A Cultural History of Gem
Stones and Jewellery (New Haven, CT, 2010), 1–10.
16 John Plotz,Portable Property: VictorianCulture on theMove (Princeton, NJ, 2008).
17 Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Rebérioux, The Third Republic from Its Ori-
gins to the Great War, 1871–1914, trans. J. F. Foster (Cambridge, 1987), 128.
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bolism and ceremonial, the sale was represented alternately as a farewell to mo-
narchical detritus, a salutary rupture with tradition, a lucrative commercial oppor-
tunity, an irreparable blow to national character, and a humiliating prostration
before foreign enemies and interlopers.
The archival documentation for the fractured, complex event of the sale is
exceptionally rich, allowing us to reconstruct the perspectives of the organizers
and their critics.18 This corpus of sources reveals how the sale was debated and
contested by elected deputies, by ofﬁcials and experts charged with its execu-
tion, by self-styled amateurs who advanced their superior competence to arbi-
trate on artistic matters, and by sensationalist journalists beneﬁting from the lib-
eralization and dramatic expansion of newspapers.19 The conduct of the sale
exposes the compromised nature of French heritage policies, shaped by the in-
terplay between different domains (the legislature, the administration, scholar-
ship, and the press) and between rival ideological conceptions. Adopting a jewel
metaphor, this article cleaves apart the 1887 sale and describes the diverse groups
who pushed for it to happen and who discursively shaped its meaning. The fol-
lowing discussion cuts the sale into four facets: ﬁrst, the debate among republican
deputies Benjamin Raspail, Jules Ferry, and Adrien Hébrard; second, the imple-
mentation by the administrative team and specialist collaborators Émile Vander-
heym and Arthur Bloche; third, the dissent of amateurs and érudits led by Ger-
main Bapst; and fourth, the antirevolutionary polemics spearheaded by Édouard
Drumont.
Taken together, these four facets demonstrate the fraught stakes, lengthy prep-
arations, and unexpected repercussions of a single “micro-event.” Analyzing
each facet in turn reveals how the sale was inspected, distorted, and magniﬁed
from different vantage points, unleashing quarrels over the interpretation of the
collection and the competence of its custodians.20 Not only did the protagonists
in the debate struggle to agree on a price for the jewels; their discord stemmed
from the clash of incommensurable categories of value. The ﬁrst facet illumi-
nates the political value of these royal treasures within the nascent republican
order, with many deputies eager to break with the hollow and unproﬁtable pomp
18 Manuscript material is scattered between the Archives Nationales (AN), the Ar-
chives desMuséesNationaux (AMN), theArchives de la Bibliothèque desArts Décoratifs
(ABAD), the Bibliothèque de l’Institut (BI), and especially the Bibliothèque Nationale de
France (BnF) (including NAF 18118–33 for the papers of Bapst & Falize, NAF 24525–40
for Bapst’s personal correspondence, and NAF 9552–9572 for papers donated by Bapst
related to the “joyaux de la couronne”).
19 Vanessa Schwartz, Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siècle
Paris (Berkeley, 1999), 13–44.
20 For a multiperspectival, almost cubist, framework see Carlo Ginzburg, “Micro-
history: Two or Three Things That I Know about It,” Critical Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1993):
10–35.
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of the past. The second facet reveals the commercial value of the stones, as the
administration carefully advertised and choreographed the sale to ensure maxi-
mum ﬁnancial return. The third facet frames the aesthetic and historic value at-
tached to the jewels, viewed by scholars as “priceless” emblems of French crafts-
manship and resilience across the centuries. The fourth facet presents the national,
often racial, values attributed to the crown jewels, whose demotion from commu-
nal heirlooms to alienated commodities heralded the seeming precariousness of
other venerable monuments in a postmonarchical, anticlerical, and rapidly glob-
alizing era. The 1887 sale generated so much curiosity and rancor because it
marked the intersection of several warring estimations or regimes of value.21
First Facet: Legislative Debate
The possibility of selling the crown jewels had ﬁrst been mooted in 1848 by the
ﬁrebrand doctor François-Vincent Raspail.22 The Second Republic unraveled
so quickly that the proposition received scant consideration, and with the emer-
gence of the Second Empire, the royal collections were not simply conserved
but dramatically expanded. Empress Eugénie commissioned Alfred Bapst to
produce ostentatious new settings for some fabled stones for her own wardrobe,
and the rest of the precious gems were displayed for the ﬁrst time in the Galérie
d’Apollon.23 During the Franco-Prussian War, the jewels were smuggled out of
the capital and concealed in a boat off Brest, duping the Communards into
thinking that they were buried in a vault under the Banque de France.24 Follow-
ing the terrible events of 1871, deputies for the ﬁrst time in a generation recon-
sidered the fate of the collection, tarnished now by associations with the Second
Empire. In August 1871 Hervé de Saisy proposed sacriﬁcing the jewels for the
sake of national solidarity: “they represent everything which is at once the most
vain and most useless, the most fragile and the most superﬂuous.” In Saisy’s ar-
gument, neither moderate royalists nor morally upstanding republicans would
ever pine for “these trinkets” (ces hochets), a phrase laced with infantilizing con-
tempt.25
21 For anthropologists’ reﬂections on this term in relation to commodities, gift ex-
change, and art, see Fred R. Myers, The Empire of Things: Material Culture and Re-
gimes of Value (Albuquerque, NM, 2001).
22 The political zigzags surrounding the sale have been admirably reconstructed in
Agnès Callu, La réunion des musées nationaux 1870–1940: Genèse et fonctionnement
(Paris, 1994), 103–31.
23 Daniel Alcouffe, “Introduction,” in Les gemmes de la couronne (Paris, 2001), 22–
24.
24 Maxime du Camp, Les convulsions de Paris, 4 vols. (Paris, 1879), 2:275–76.
25 Other contemptuous terms include les oripeaux (baubles), les jouets (toys), les
brimborions (trinkets), and les cailloux de prix (expensive pebbles).
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The boldness of the measure echoed the desperate public mood following de-
feat and the hefty reparations imposed by the Treaty of Frankfurt. Other propos-
als in 1871 called for an auction of royal palaces, which would purge the fur-
niture they contained.26 Happily, the new government succeeded in settling its
debts more rapidly than expected, and drastic schemes of liquidation could be
shelved. Yet the jewels remained in the spotlight throughout the 1870s. First
there was the question of restitutions to Empress Eugénie, who demanded
the return of pieces deemed her personal property, even if their silver mounts
had been purchased from the Liste civile.27 A commission of experts was as-
sembled—including Alfred Bapst—in order to determine how to divide up
the disputed pieces.28 Second, the jewels garnered widespread newspaper cov-
erage when they were displayed as part of the 1878 Exposition Universelle
(ﬁg. 1).29 In that year, with the republicans scenting victory following the Seize
Mai crisis, a new attack was launched by Benjamin Raspail, who was deter-
mined to complete his father’s proposition. Raspail wanted to obliterate the
jewels as revenge against the regime that had sentenced his family to exile after
1851. Backed by a cohort of radical republicans—including Louis Blanc, Mar-
tin Nadaud, and Georges Clemenceau—he argued that the jewels were “use-
less, either in a monarchy, or in a republic” and that it was unacceptable to let
the capital they represented remain “unproductive.”30 Raspail invoked cross-party
consensus, but his vendetta fed on revulsion at the extravagance of the Second Em-
pire. Anecdotes circulated about the ostentatious monstrosities that Eugénie had
commissioned from jewelers, inspired by her aping of theatrical costumes.31 The
imperial crown fashioned in 1852 was described by Raspail as an object “in the
most hateful taste. In all respects, its place is at the Mint, for ﬁre can purify every-
thing.”32
Behind these aesthetic judgments was a clear political agenda. The commis-
sion set up to consider Raspail’s motion acknowledged the suspicions that the
jewels were being retained as if “waiting for a monarchical restoration.”33 This
was not an idle fear in 1879, although the next few years were decisive both for
26 Séance, November 17, 1871, Conseil général of the Préfecture du départment de la
Côte-d’Or, AN O5/2308.
27 Catherine Granger, L’Empereur et les arts: La liste civile de Napoléon III (Paris,
2005), 369–444.
28 Letter from the Minister of Finances to Alfred Bapst, January 19, 1875, BnF NAF
18130, no. 37.
29 Le Monde Illustré, August 10, 1878.
30 Chambre des députés, no. 818, June 7, 1878, 2–3. Many parliamentary debates
have been collated in AMN M-4: “Dossier–Diamants de la Couronne.”
31 Le Temps, December 8, 1881.
32 Chambre des députés, no. 782, May 6, 1882, 8.
33 Chambre des députés, no. 1859, July 31, 1879, 3.
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Fig. 1.—Charles Baude, “Kiosque des diamants de la couronne dans la Galérie d’Iéna,”
in Simon de Vandière, L’Exposition universelle de 1878 illustré (Paris, 1879). Hay Li-
brary, Brown University.
the embedding of the Republic and the proscription of any monarchical alter-
native. The unfolding debate about the jewels ran in direct parallel with the col-
lapse of Bonapartist and Legitimist ambitions following the deaths of the Prince
Imperial in 1879 and the comte de Chambord in 1883—as well as the demoli-
tion of the charred remains of the Tuileries in 1883 and the banishment of the
Orléanist princes in June 1886.34 Sensing the winds of change, Raspail rejoiced
that monarchism seemed to be in retreat across Europe: Had not the Portuguese
and Spanish monarchs sold off many of their own “baubles” in 1878? Consid-
ering Portugal, which was still a monarchy, had parted with these pointless or-
naments, surely it would be perverse if the French Republic “hesitated a single
instant to shake off the last vestiges of the monarchy”?35 By 1881 Raspail was
conﬁdently predicting that 35 or even 40 million francs might be raised (a sum
almost double the ofﬁcial estimate of the collection’s value).36 Thrilled at the
prospect of this windfall, Raspail called for the entire collection to be liquidated,
since even the historic stones had been deformed through their tasteless appropri-
ation by the Bonapartes. The proceeds should then be reinvested as funds for those
injured at work. “The crown jewels have been paid for with the money of the na-
tion; it is only right to give back to the people what belongs to the people.”37
An intervention in the spring of 1882 slammed the brakes on such redistrib-
utive fantasies. Moderate deputies were unwilling to countenance a total alien-
ation and insisted that objects of primary artistic or historical value should be
conserved. Moreover, Jules Ferry wanted the proceeds not to be frittered away
on a Caisse des invalides but to be poured into the coffers of France’s museums.
He cited humiliating ﬁgures: if the Germans allocated 406,000 francs for annual
acquisitions to the Berlin museums, and the British earmarked 589,000 francs
for London collections, the French could muster only 162,000 francs, shared be-
tween the Louvre and Luxembourg, Saint-Germain, and Versailles.When it came
to voting extra credits, too, the record was embarrassing. French digs at Delphi
had been starved of funds, in sharp contrast to triumphant German archaeological
projects at Pergamon and Olympia. Moreover, major auctions—such as those at
San Donato in 1870 and at Hamilton Palace in 1882—saw the price of objets
d’art hit stratospheric levels.38 New sources of funding were urgently needed if
the French hoped to withstand “formidable capitalists of the old and newworlds.”
Otherwise, the cash-strapped museums would be forced to petition the Chamber
34 Louis Iandoli, “The Palace of the Tuileries and Its Demolition: 1871–1883,” The
French Review 79, no. 5 (2006): 986–1008.
35 Débats parlementaires, July 29, 1881, 1824. Cuttings fromDébats parlementaires
appear in AN O5/2308.
36 Note from Marchand, September 3, 1881, AN O5/2308.
37 Chambre des députés, no. 156, November 14, 1881, 4.
38 Gerard Reitlinger, The Economics of Taste II: The Rise and Fall of Objets d’Art
Prices since 1750 (London, 1963), 133–41.
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for emergency supplements—such as the 118,000 francs required to buy four
Courbet canvases, or the 207,000 francs requested to cover purchases at the sale
of the collection owned by Louis-Charles Timbal.39 Such sporadic generosity
could not prevent France from slipping behind, for “in the domain of art,” Ferry
warned, “as in that of industry, not to go forward is to succumb to an imminent
decadence.”40 Channeling the funds toward museums would also serve the re-
publican agenda for education, capitalizing on the 1882 schooling reforms. Hip-
polyteMaze insisted that publicmuseumswere not simply “places for promenad-
ing” but also “schools” from whose soil future French genius might germinate.
Out of the capital locked up in jewels that had decorated the foreheads of princes,
Maze aspired to make “a new crown for France herself,” thus afﬁrming the alli-
ance of “the art of taste with our republican democracy.”41
Both camps eventually agreed that only part of the collection would be sub-
ject to auction, with exceptions made for jewels that fell into one of three cate-
gories. First, the most prestigious pieces, such as the Régent Diamond (valued
on its own at 12 million francs in 1791), were held back for the Louvre.42 Even
Raspail conceded that the latter should be saved, although he maintained that to
the naked eye it looked like the plug on a decanter (bouchon de carafe).43 A sec-
ond class of stones of mineralogical merit were to be dispatched to the Muséum
d’Histoire Naturelle and the École des Mines. Pieces in a third category, largely
consisting of diplomatic gifts and defunct decorations, were condemned to be
broken up, with the stones removed for sale and the settings melted down at
the mint. This category also included a number of items of regalia—such as
the glaive du dauphin and the crown of Charles X—since they were deemed
to be lacking in artistic merit, and it was feared “that these emblems of royalty
might be acquired by some kind of Barnum and become the opportunity for a
scandalous and lucrative exhibition.”44 The sorting of the jewels into categories
was overseen by a commission created in 1882, although not all its recommen-
dations were heeded.45 For instance, the panel advised that all eight of the “Ma-
39 Chambre des députés, no. 782, May 6, 1882, 1311.
40 Débats parlementaires, June 21, 1882, 976.
41 Ibid., 974.
42 In addition to the Régent, the Louvre retained the epée militaire, the broche reli-
quaire (designed by Frédéric Bapst), the watch of the Dey of Algiers, the large chimère
ruby, the pearl and enamel dragon, a small insignia from Denmark’s Order of the Ele-
phant, and one of eight Mazarin diamonds.
43 Le Matin, January 25, 1886.
44 Parisis (Émile Blavet), La Vie Parisienne: 1887 (Paris, 1888), 108.
45 The commission consisted of Émile Vanderheym, president of the Chambre syn-
dicale des diamants; Paul Jannettaz from the Sorbonne, assistant naturaliste at the Mu-
séum; Charles Martial-Bernard, president of the Chambre syndicale de la joaillerie;
Honoré, an ouvrier-ciseleur who had been awarded prizes in the 1878 Universal Exhi-
bition; and Paul Bapst, descendant of the dynasty of court jewelers.
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zarin” diamonds be retained for the Louvre due to the spectrum of polychrome
effects, but the Chamber deemed that one representative sample sufﬁced.46
With these subtractions noted, the sale of the remaining jewels was voted for
in June 1882 by a margin of 342 to 85. Yet this striking result disguises the true
extent of the ideological divisions. Raspail maintained a rhetoric of redistribu-
tion and put forward his Caisse des invalides in order to “deﬁnitively implant
the Republic” among the workers.47 He urged fellow republicans to hurry in or-
der to realize the dreams of a “social” republic ﬁrst articulated in 1848. By con-
trast, the newspaper proprietor Adrien Hébrard intervened in the Senate to dis-
credit Raspail’s inchoate plans, which reeked of “state socialism,” and instead
endorsed extra spending on buying artworks for museums. “The works that
spring from the hands of [France’s] artists and workers—are they not her jewels
and their fame her crown?”48 Despite the deadlock between the Chamber and
the Senate, republicans in both houses shared a vision of a patrimonymade “pro-
ductive” in inspiring scientiﬁc research at theMuséum d’Histoire Naturelle, pre-
serving outstanding items in the Louvre, educating artisans throughmasterpieces
of craftsmanship, and equipping France with the budget necessary to ﬂourish in
what Hébrard called “the great competition of the current moment, the law of all
civilized countries.”Only a major injection of funds would allow France to keep
its stature in these “peaceful struggles” (luttes paciﬁques).49 Dissent from mon-
archist deputies was limited to warnings about clumsy planning and poor returns,
as well as sniggering at the absurd notion of a president of the Republic trying to
wear the Régent in his hat.50
The emboldened republicans decided that before the jewels were placed un-
der the hammer, they would be exhibited once more. In 1884, a special octag-
onal vitrine was installed in the Salle des États of the Louvre. Having served as
a throne room under the Second Empire, this venue now provided a spectacular
backdrop for the ambitions of the Union Centrale des Arts Décoratifs (UCAD).
The objectives of the UCAD evolved from an earlier focus on the education of
skilled workers into a forum for rich collectors to display their prime acquisi-
tions.51 Entitled “Exposition nationale des arts industrielles,” the resulting show
was a hybrid affair, with the “retrospective” section of donations awkwardly
juxtaposed with specimens of contemporary artisanal production, intended to
46 “Rapport au nom de la commission chargé de faire l’expertise des joyaux de l’état
dits diamants de la couronne,” February 23, 1882, AN O5/2320.
47 Chambre des députés, no. 782, May 6, 1882, 7, 12.
48 Sénat, no. 40, February 12, 1884, 6–7.
49 Ibid., 6.
50 The opposition retorted that the insinuation that the Republic lacked majesty rang
hollow after the sight of Louis-Philippe in his white trousers, twiddling an umbrella. See
the speech of the comte de Lanjuinais in Débats parlementaires, February 4, 1886, 124.
51 Rossella Pezone, “Controverses sur l’aménagement d’un Musée des Arts Déco-
ratifs à Paris au XIXe siècle,” Histoire de l’Art 16 (1991): 55–65.
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prove that “the industriels, the workers themselves are already artists or are be-
coming so more and more.”52 The mayor of the eighteenth arrondissement,
Émile Bin, designed a vast decorative allegory in which the City of Paris ap-
peared holding the rod of government.53 She was ﬂanked by other personiﬁca-
tions in a tableau of republican verities, such as Commerce, Science, and Em-
pire:
The Genius of France, who shakes his ﬂag with one hand and carries an olive branch
with the other, presents her [the Ville de Paris] with the diverse national industries. Im-
mediately to the left of the Ville de Paris, an allegorical ﬁgure of Commerce and Industry
seems to await from her a creative impulse. At her feet, Labour brings his instruments.
On either side are emblematic subjects which complete the ensemble, namely: on the left
of the spectator, Truth leaning on Science, trampling down blind Routine and unproduc-
tive Laziness; on the other hand, the colonies bring their industrial products to the Ville
de Paris while the sun lights up the horizon.54
The mural expressed the idealism, as well as the partisanship, that had under-
pinned the parliamentary debates. It was a visual manifesto for the principle,
according to General Boulanger, that “a democracy sure of itself and conﬁdent
in its future has a duty to free itself of these objects of luxury, without utility and
without value.”55 It also proclaimed the alliance of Marianne with the market,
hailing enlightened global commerce as a way for the Republic to fulﬁll its re-
generative mission.56 After an opening attended by President Grévy and lumi-
naries from politics, business, and the arts, the short-lived show attracted thirty
thousand visitors over its three-week duration.57
In the short term, the moderate republicans triumphed; the decision to sell
passed into law deﬁnitively on December 7, 1886 (on condition that the ﬁnal
destination of the proceeds be postponed for future debate).58 But if the princi-
ple was secured, the execution was still uncertain, for the outcome of the sale
would depend on both on the vagaries of market forces and the collaboration of
specialist groups like the Parisian jewelers. Already in 1884 some commenta-
tors attributed the exhibition’s success to the “elite of amateurs” who had lent
52 Exposition nationale des arts industrielles: Diamants de la Couronne; Salle des
états, Palais du Louvre (Paris, 1884), 9.
53 Bin also painted an iconographic series for the centenary of 1789. See Pascal Ory,
Une nation pour la mémoire: 1889, 1939, 1989 trois jubilées révolutionnaires (Paris,
1992), 73, 96.
54 Exposition nationale, 25.
55 Chambre des députés, no. 1352, December 7, 1886, 2.
56 Lisa Tiersten, Marianne in the Marketplace: Envisioning Consumer Society in
Fin-de-Siècle France (Berkeley, 2001).
57 Émile Vanderheym, Notice historique sur les joyaux de la couronne et objets des
sacres exposés au Musée national du Louvre, galérie d’Apollon (Paris, 1889), 32.
58 Journal ofﬁciel, January 11, 1887, 1.
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stones from their own vitrines to “serve as an escort to these incomparable
crown diamonds, just as the great aristocrats and noble ladies used to form a
cortege around the all-powerful masters of these gems and these jewels.”59 If
the 1884 exhibition resembled a funeral rite for the defunct monarchy, then the
proﬁts and the dignity of the 1887 sale would also depend on the ability of the
administration to reconcile antagonistic interest groups.
Second Facet: Administrative Implementation
The task of coordinating the unprecedented event was entrusted to two ofﬁcials:
the directeur générale de l’enregistrement, des domaines et du timbre, Tiphaigne,
and his chief advisor, Chaumard, directeur des domaines de la Seine. Aware that
he was out of his depth, Chaumard recognized the need to draw on “the insight
and celebrity [notoriété] of ﬁgures who have a technical competence that no one
inmy department could claim.”60 This embrace of collaborators also chimeswith
two prongs of republican cultural policy. On one side, there was a coherent vision
for democratizing the arts, which accorded to the state the functions of oversight
and symbolic recognition.61 On the other, the practical delivery of policy was de-
volved to groups in civil society, such as the bourgeoisie who supported localmu-
seums or the societies of artists who from 1882 were charged with organizing the
Salon.62 The state was not simply capitulating to a laissez-faire outlook, although
arts budgets across the ThirdRepublicwere certainly shrinking.63 Rather, asMarie-
Claude Genet-Delacroix argues, the regime introduced a double logic in which
some matters of “national” artistic importance were assigned to regulation (such
as the protection of historic monuments), whereas other matters, such as the suc-
cess of the modern “French” school of painting, could best be promoted via the
market.64 In contrast to monolithic myths of the French state, honoriﬁc public
oversight was combined with remarkable latitude for private enterprise. Accord-
ing toNicholasGreen, a key consequence of this recalibrationwas “the pervasive
presence and input of ‘neutral’ expertise (and its informal cultural repertoire) . . . a
59 Louis Énault, Les diamants de la couronne, publié avec le concours, pour la
partie technique, de M. Émile Vanderheym (Paris, 1884), 112–13.
60 Letter from Chaumard to Tiphaigne, December 31, 1886, AN O5/2320.
61 Miriam R. Levin, Republican Art and Ideology in Late Nineteenth-Century
France (Ann Arbor, MI, 1986).
62 Daniel Sherman, “Art Museums, Inspections and the Limits to Cultural Policy in
the Early Third Republic,” Historical Reﬂections 15, no. 2 (1988): 337–59.
63 Paul Gerbod, “L’action culturelle de l’état au XIXe siècle (à travers les divers
chapîtres du budget général),” Revue Historique 270, no. 2 (1983): 389–401.
64 Marie-Claude Genet-Delacroix, “National Art and French Art: History, Art, and
Politics during the Early Third Republic,” Studies in the History of Art 68 (2005): 39, 46.
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crucial factor in shaping the administrative dimension of republican hegemony
from the 1870s.”65
This need for “informal” expertise was especially pressing when it came to
the delicate business of predicting and coaxing a specialist market. Tiphaigne
diagnosed the pitfalls ahead: ﬁrst, there was the danger that the sale would
not attract the requisite number and quality of buyers; second, there was the risk
that the value of the jewels might plummet, especially in a depressed economic
climate; third, there was the alarming possibility that bids would be dominated
by cartels of buyers who would manipulate the sale through a process known as
“revision.” Such maneuvers had devastated the 1874 auction of the duke of
Brunswick’s jewels in Geneva.66 To prevent such chicanery, seating arrange-
ments in the salesroom were carefully planned, inserting randomly allocated
places to prevent communication between improvised “coalitions.” To reduce
auctioneers’ fees and increase capacity, the location was ﬁxed not at the Hôtel
Drouot auction house but in the Pavillon de Flore of the Louvre, decorated with
the curtains, paneling, and security devices recycled from the UCAD exhibition
in 1884.67 Every detail was carefully choreographed, from the distribution of
tickets and incognito security agents to the surveillance of the standing public
of four hundred persons.68
Tiphaigne assembled a team of three experienced men to prepare the cata-
logue and manage the bidding. The Minister of Finance immediately recom-
mendedEugèneEscribe, an advisor during the sale of porcelain from theListe civile
in 1873, and Émile Vanderheym, who had assisted in auctioning the Rothschild
jewels in London and was president of the Chambre Syndicale des Diamants.69
When choosing a third collaborator, Chaumard wanted an intermediary between
the authorities and the leading Paris jewelers. It is a sign of the anticipated ben-
eﬁts of the role that politicians waded in to push their favored candidates.70 The
post eventually fell to the young jewel dealer Arthur Bloche, noteworthy for his
“very large activity & rare competence.”71 He further endeared himself by offer-
65 Nicholas Green, “All the Flowers in the Field: The State, Liberalism and Art in
France under the Third Republic,” Oxford Art Journal 10, no. 1 (1987): 74–75.
66 “Rapport de M. Bloche sur les Diamants de la Couronne,” AN O5/2308.
67 Letter from Chaumard to Tiphaigne, March 29, 1887, ANO5/2308. On the reverse
of his summary report Tiphaigne confessed that he had originally wanted to enlist the
courtiers de commerce, who had experience at the Bourse, but the Minister had conﬁded
the task to “two persons who I see as unworthy.” “Rapport générale” from Tiphaigne to
Ministère des Finances, August 31, 1887, AN O5/2308.
68 Letter from Chaumard to Tiphaigne, March 29, 1887, AN O5/2308.
69 Letter from Tiphaigne to Ministère des Finances, January 14, 1887, AN O5/2320.
70 Escribe was “strongly supported” by senators Campayré and Devès, while Bloche
was backed by the deputy Dubort. Letter from Tiphaigne to Ministère des Finances, Jan-
uary 14, 1887, AN O5/2320.
71 Letter from Chaumard to Tiphaigne, March 15, 1887, AN O5/2320.
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ing his services absolutely free.72 At moments Tiphaigne would doubt the wis-
dom of his appointment: on learning of Bloche’s involvement in a fraud case
in March 1887, Tiphaigne scrawled in red pen, “No luck with the choice of
our experts!” and “German Jew charged with the sale of the crown jewels.”73
Yet Bloche’s great asset was his insight into the mindset of the Parisian jewelers,
poisoned by “political grudges or commercial jealousies. . . . Fighting against
them would have been, perhaps, to ensure if not certain defeat, then at least a se-
ries of harmful incidents.”74 The sale coincided with an 1884 dispute between the
Chambre Syndicale de la Bijouterie and the government over quality controls on
exports of gold and silver.75 It was feared that the nonparticipation of Paris’s star
jewelers would either heap discredit on the merchandise or abandon the ﬁeld to
outsiders. Bloche’s tactic was to give the impression that the sale was not being
inﬂicted from on high but was organized with the jewelers’ aid. He ﬂatteringly
pointed out “the important role that they should occupy in the battles that were
forming.” These enticing words were accompanied with ﬁnancial advantages:
Bloche and Vanderheym refused to take personal commissions from rich ama-
teurs, who were instead directed to employ Parisian jewelers as their agents
(on condition that these amateurs also attend the sale in person). Moreover,
Bloche pushed for accredited French buyers to be allowed to pay for their pur-
chases in instalments and to form tactical associations in order to keep as many
of the jewels in France as possible.76
Bloche also recognized that the sale had to create buzz among connoisseurs;
it was “a veritable event” that should be “dressed in a commercial, but not mer-
cantile, guise.” Reputable agents de propagande were hired to spread news of
the sale abroad, often hand delivering the catalogue to well-known foreign col-
lectors.77 From an early stage global communications were embraced—hardly
surprising in light of the growing American presence in European salesrooms.78
Tiphaigne employed the advertising agencies Dollinger and Haval to issue a
statement in “all the Paris newspapers, in the principal newssheets of the prov-
inces and in the great newspapers of Europe and America.”79 The sale also
72 Letter from Bloche to Chaumard, February 11, 1887, AN O5/2320.
73 Undated note, alongside cutting from La Loi, April 6, 1887, AN O5/2308.
74 “Rapport de M. Bloche sur les Diamants de la Couronne,” AN O5/2308.
75 Jacqueline Viruega, La bijouterie parisienne: Du Second Empire à la Première
Guerre mondiale (Paris, 2004), 198–200.
76 “Rapport de M. Bloche sur les Diamants de la Couronne,” AN O5/2308.
77 Ibid.
78 Letter from Tiphaigne to Chaumard, February 7, 1887, AN O5/2308. See Véro-
nique Long, Mécènes des deux mondes: Les collectionneurs donateurs du Louvre et de
l’Art Institute de Chicago 1879–1940 (Rennes, 2007).
79 Tiphaigne to Dauphin, August 31, 1887, “Rapport générale,” 17–19, AN O5/
2308.
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courted the cosmopolitan elite, melding ofﬁcial and mondain Paris. A contin-
gent of forty-six ambassadors was invited to the opening of the sale, represent-
ing not just the European powers but also Turkey, China, Japan, the United
States, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Liberia. Invitations to join the political, admin-
istrative, and diplomatic top brass were issued to the cercles of high society, in-
cluding the Jockey Club, les Mirlitons, L’Escrime, Les DeuxMondes, le Cercle
Franco-Americain, le Cercle de la Chasse, le Cercle de la Librarie, and the
Yacht Club.80 The attraction the sale exerted for le tout Paris can be deduced
from the many dignitaries who asked for entry passes for their female friends.81
The May date was chosen precisely because it ﬁtted in with the social calendar:
the elites would not yet have left for summer in the country, and the city would
be thronged with foreigners.82 Open for late-night visits with electric lighting,
the exhibition of the jewels allowed fashionable society women to imagine how
luminous the jewels might appear if worn at balls and parties.83
Two things were not in the hands of the administrators and threatened to undo
the fastidious preparations. The ﬁrst was timing: although Tiphaigne and Chau-
mard had begun planning from 1878, they had no idea when the event would
take place owing to the impasse between the Chamber and the Senate. By the
end of 1886, Vanderheym feared that the current buoyant prices might be
“promptly followed [by] a regressive movement.”84 Estimates of the expected
proﬁts oscillated wildly: the valuation shrank from the 8,650,000 francs pre-
dicted by the commission in 1882 to a mere 4,179,662 francs in the sober cal-
culations of Bloche and Vanderheym ﬁve years later.85 The second danger
was the attitude of the press; managing media relations was imperative because
adverse comments might dent the desirability of the collection. The minister of
ﬁnancesAlbert Dauphin authorized periodic payments amounting to 19,000 francs
for editors of publications such as Le Gaulois, Le Temps, Le Figaro, Événement,
Voltaire,Gil Blas, Le Matin, Le Courier du Soir,Galignani’s Messenger, and La
Lanterne who would publicize the sale and follow the government line.86 While
he could count on the ﬁdelity of republican papers, Tiphaigne hoped that through
sweeteners he might secure “the sympathy, or at least the silence” of the “organs
80 See invitation lists in AN O5/2320.
81 See letters from Sylvain du Boif (May 7, 1887), Bowden (May 12, 1887), Poubelle
(May 26, 1887), AN O5/2320.
82 Letter from Tiphaigne to Ministère des Finances (Dauphin), January 14, 1887, AN
O5/2320.
83 Le Matin, March 22, 1887.
84 Letters from Chaumard to Tiphaigne, October 15 and November 22, 1886, AN
O5/2320.
85 See “Diamants, perles et pierreries,” AN O5/2308.
86 Tiphaigne asked Chaumard to transmit all relevant articles that appeared in these
sponsored papers. Letter from Tiphaigne to Chaumard, May 20, 1887, AN O5/2320.
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of the opposition.”87 Yet instead of acquiescence, Tiphaigne found that enemy
papers gleefully ﬁlled up their columns with “the echo of more or less far-fetched
slanders and revelations about the conduct of my administration.”88 Frommalice
or ignorance, articles spread false information about the timing, the procedures,
and the extent of the sale, implying that not even the Régent diamond would be
spared.89 Paranoid accusations and “curious revelations” insisted that the admin-
istration would line the pockets of corrupt individuals.90 If the sale raised 20 mil-
lion francs, then it was alleged that 1,600,000 francs would be creamed off by the
hired experts. It was intolerable to think of the auctioneer, “a monopolist” rather
than a patriot, getting rich from “a few minutes of peaceful activity, needing no
knowledge, requiring no responsibility! Things should not be like this in France,
in a democratic country!”91
Tiphaigne countered that his critics were so poorly informed that few gave
their accusations much credence.92 Yet the polemics were indicative of how
clannish the art world appeared to outsiders. An occasion of national impor-
tance had been entrusted to private individuals whose authority stemmed from
their informal contacts and commercial client books. The public auction, sup-
posedly a watchword for transparency, instead generated paranoia about hidden
cabals. Despite attempts to square republican morality with consumer behavior,
fears about impure or unequal markets endured.93 A representative of workers
in the jewelry trade petitioned deputies to be vigilant against any “coalition be-
tween international capitalists.”94 Newspapers thundered that the government
must do everything in its power to “disarm the intrigues of la bande noire”
and stamp out “coalitions of buyers, to prevent resale or revision.”95 At least
one scheme, run by Lepée Esmelin, planned to unite a number of investors be-
hind a communal purchase, determined to stop the jewels succumbing to “a few
privilegiés of high ﬁnance” and big diamond houses motivated by pure “spec-
ulation.”96
87 Tiphaigne, “Rapport générale,” 18.
88 Ibid., 20.
89 La Lanterne, February 26, 1883; Gil Blas, December 23, 1884; Le Figaro, Febru-
ary 3, 1882; L’Intransigeant, January 28, 1887.
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91 Irénée Blanc, “Les diamants de la couronne.”
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93 Victoria Thompson, The Virtuous Marketplace: Women and Men, Money and Pol-
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Stung by the press backlash, Tiphaigne diluted the blaring publicity recom-
mended by Bloche. The collection ought to be visible, but not too visible, for the
function of the sale was to “wipe out in certain ways the traces of vanished re-
gimes.”97 He dispensed with commissioning a literary preface to the catalogue
and excluded from the bidding any ceremonial decorations produced under the
Second Empire in case their sight in the salesroom might unleash “regrettable
displays.”98 Yet this attempt to subtract the politics from the occasion was in vain
when every purchase was open to political interpretation: who would get the li-
ons’ share, French or foreign buyers?Whowas secretly creaming off the proﬁts?
Andwhat dark fate awaited the jewels after they departed the safe? Henri Roche-
fort jested that the whole collection could have been easily disposed of through
a lottery of 30 million tickets each costing a franc or two. Fetishistic royalists
would purchase all the tickets in order to prevent the jewels falling into “dem-
agogic hands.” He explained:
When a piece of furniture worth 150 francs sells for 500,000 on the grounds that it be-
longed to Dubarry, who can doubt the delirium that would seize amateurs of memories
and regrets at the hope of being able to install in their vitrines a necklace that served
Marie-Antoinette, a bracelet that clasped the arm of Marie-Louise, or a simple rhine-
stone comb that held back the shells with which Marie-Amélie liked to frame her face?
Some would take tickets out of tenderness, others out of speculation; but we see no dis-
advantage in that the Republic would beneﬁt from the passions unleashed.99
La Lanterne imagined sordid futures for discarded regalia: “Those family sa-
bres would have made quite an impression on a fairground stage or in a perfor-
mance of La Belle Hélène! There was even talk for a while about le Chat Noir.”
The circus, the operetta, the cabaret—this was all the relics of monarchy were
good for in the modern era, to be hawked abroad and “scattered around the four
corners of the world.”100 While Rochefort rejoiced at this profanation répub-
licaine, opponents of the sale insisted that the jewels were not gaudy playthings
but integral to French art and French history.
Third Facet: Intransigent Erudition
In 1884, the novelist Louis Énault observed that the decision to sell had pro-
voked “in the world of historians, artists, thinkers, poets, and women a real emo-
tion, lively and profound.”101 Énault pitched this coalition of ﬁne-feeling souls
97 Tiphaigne, “Rapport générale,” 14.
98 Ibid., 12.
99 Henri Rochefort, “Couronnes en lotérie,” L’Instransigeant, February 8, 1887.
100 “Joyaux à vendre,” La Lanterne, January 16, 1887.
101 Énault, Les diamants, ii.
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against the brutal “logiciens who rate algebra above sentiment.” In contrast to
centuries of patient accumulation, these precious stones now faced an undigni-
ﬁed, promiscuous circulation. “It does not please us at all to think of the studs of
Anne of Austria, the diamonds of Louis XIV, the rubies of Louis XVI and the
pearls of Marie-Antoinette passing, from sale to sale, into the hands of the deal-
ers.”102 Other journalists personiﬁed France as one of those “loose and destitute
old women” forced to sell their heirlooms when “creditors were at the door.”103
The stones were anthropomorphized to spark outrage at the way they were being
mistreated, shut away in the basement of the Ministry of Finances: “prisoners in
the depths,” “buried in the shadows,” “mutilated, stripped bare.” “We are going
to judge them, condemn them, and banish them,” protested Le Figaro in an ar-
ticle entitled “Carnet d’un mondain”: “as if the crown jewels did not form part of
the indivisible fortune of France, of the same order as the paintings of the Louvre
or the collections of the museums.” The stones evoked painful memories of Eu-
génie and the diamond necklace affair entrapping Marie-Antoinette (“The sov-
ereign would only receive from her people the red collar of the martyr”).104 The
intimate connection between doomed royal bodies and the doomed stones in-
vested the jewels with an “aura of sanctity” and a quasi-organic vitality.105
For if it seemed that “glory had left its rays” imprinted on the stones, then “sor-
row seems to have crystallized in them some tears” and even “drops of blood.”106
Such imagery predominated in the royalist imaginary, with its constellation
of relics and martyrs, but it had limited resonance with a wider public. Across
the 1880s opponents of the sale appealed not just to monarchist sentimentality
but also to economic reasoning and feelings of national honor. Énault noted that
the permanent exhibition of England’s crown jewels at the Tower of London gen-
erated 150,000 francs a year.107 Enriched by Napoleonic victories in Germany—
indeed, the Régent had once decorated the hilt of Bonaparte’s sword—Énault
apostrophized the collection as “one of the ornaments of France herself.”108
Gaston Calmette went one better, suggesting that the evolution of the collection
enacted the national epic in miniature: “The history of the crown jewels is, in ef-
fect, the history of France herself. Humble at the beginning, they grow and mul-
tiply when France herself grows and multiplies: their shine becomes stronger and
102 Ibid., 137.
103 Tout-Paris, “Notes parisiens- les joyaux de la couronne,” Le Gaulois, January 14,
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their value greater. . . . Everything is hence compressed in this common and indis-
soluble existence of men and things.”109 Calmette insisted that the time had now
come for the collection to go abroad to enlighten other peoples; “it will give at
once a profoundly moving and profoundly rare education to all other nations.”110
For Calmette, writing in defense of the government’s decision, the sale was pic-
tured as an extension of France’s civilizing mission.
The symbolic translation of the jewels from the dynastic to the national body
was effected most subversively by Germain Bapst.111 Art historian, bibliophile,
and érudit, Bapst was also heir to a dynasty that had been founded by George-
Michel Bapst in the mid-eighteenth century and had proudly served the crown
for nine generations. Alfred Bapst, Germain’s father, had worked for Eugénie
and had obtained glowing praise for his displays at the 1878 exhibition. After
his death in 1879, the business split between “Bapst & Falize” (formed by the
partnership of Germain with Lucien Falize, another jeweller-critic) and “J. & P.
Bapst et ﬁls” (run by Germain’s younger brothers Jules and Paul).112 Bapst fam-
ily members had contributed at several moments to deciding the collection’s
fate: Alfred had advised on extracting Eugénie’s jewels from the Liste civile
in 1875, whereas Paul had sat alongside Vanderheym on the 1882 commission
(although he kept a wary independence).113 If Alfred and Paul Bapst were sus-
pected of being uncooperative, Germain seemed to be wantonly disruptive.
“Attached by family tradition to the conservation of this collection, of which
my father was the ﬁnal jeweller,” Bapst told the director of museums in 1887,
“I have refused to be involved in the destruction of it and in the present circum-
stances I hold more than ever to the line of conduct that I have pursued up to
now.”114 Benjamin Raspail knew the Bapsts as troublesome opponents and de-
nounced them in the Chamber as Orléanist creatures, “agents of reaction who are
playing a double game.”115 Raspail was undecided whether this sabotage was
109 Gaston Calmette, “Préface,” in Vanderheym, Notice historique, ii.
110 Ibid., ii.
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motivated by “political affections” or “personal interests,” although he found it
difﬁcult to separate the two.116
Germain Bapst styled himself as the tribune for the Chambre Syndicale de la
Bijouterie, Joaillerie et Orfeverie, which he described with deliberate archaism
as a “corporation” whose patriotism precluded it from assisting the sale.117 He
also belonged to a generation of amateur historians in the 1870s who embraced
archival research to document collections, sponsor design reform, and protect
historical monuments.118 Under the inﬂuence of his friends Jérôme Pichon
and Louis Courajod, Bapst had mined eighteenth-century inventories and cata-
logues as a means of accessing “the most intimate facts of private life.”119 Echo-
ing the approach of the Goncourt brothers, Bapst reconstructed the inventory
of Marie-Joseph de Saxe, mother of the ﬁnal Bourbon kings, to describe her
(lost) library, her wardrobe, and the jewels of her toilette.120 Hailing Bapst
for “your science and your taste,” one admirer claimed that the study of personal
effects had allowed the reader “to penetrate into the intimacy of a princely
life.”121 But while material culture acted as a portal for entering the old regime,
Bapst was also a champion of modern industrial reform through his activities
with the UCAD.122 He frequently underlined the connections between the de-
velopment of craftsmanship and the ﬂowering of the national genius before
French taste was denatured by Renaissance excess.123 This conviction that past
styles should inform future reﬁnement explains why he viewed the alienation of
the crown jewels as “prejudicial” to the ediﬁcation of French artisans and con-
sumers.124
Énault’s emotive protest against the sale had glossed over the jewels’ speciﬁc
history; indeed, his account began with a paean to precious jewels found in He-
brew, Egyptian, Chinese, and Indian mythologies.125 By contrast, Bapst’s 1889
Histoire des joyaux de la couronne drew on family business records supple-
116 Le Matin, January 25, 1886.
117 Germain Bapst, “UCAD Conférence 12 avril 1887,” AMAD, Mss Z-23, 184–85.
118 Silverman, Art Nouveau, 109–33.
119 Germain Bapst, “Les diamants de la couronne,” Gazette des Beaux-Arts, January
1887, 55.
120 Germain Bapst, Inventaire de Marie-Josphe de Saxe, dauphine de France (Paris,
1883), 62, 104–12.
121 Letter from Jourdain to Bapst, May 10, 1883, BnF NAF 24533, no. 116.
122 Germain Bapst, Le Musée rétrospectif du métal à l’exposition de l’Union Centrale
des Beaux-Arts (Paris, 1880).
123 Germain Bapst, Les métaux dans l’antiquité et au moyen-age- l’étain (Paris,
1884), v–vii. Bapst’s views resemble those of Louis Courajod; see Michela Passini,
La Fabrique de l’art national: Le nationalisme et les origines de l’histoire de l’art en
France et en Allemagne, 1870–1933 (Paris, 2012), 9–58.
124 Bapst, “Les diamants,” 55.
125 Énault, Les diamants, iv–v.
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mented by archival research in the British Museum and Public Records Ofﬁce
by his brother Edmond, employee of the French embassy in London.126 This
positivist rigor underwrote his claim for the jewels as embodiments of the na-
tional drama, both fashioned by and fashioners of French history. As he told
attendees at a meeting of the UCAD in April 1887, a month before the sale, de-
fending the jewels was like defending the nation’s frontiers:
Gentlemen, certain historic objects are identiﬁed with the milieu they have passed
through or the events whose birth they have seen. They recall to the imagination of those
who look at them the memories of the past with a charm and a poetry that will often be
missing from printed or manuscript documents. When these objects, thanks to circum-
stances, have been mixed into all the great events of history, then they have become an
integral part of the country, and, in this regard, their conservation is as dear to all patriots
as that of a province or a fortress (Applause).127
Through his research Bapst overturned the assumption of the commission that
the collection began in 1661 with Cardinal Mazarin. Rather he demonstrated
that the origins of the collection went back to 1530 and to François I who, in
the wake of the humiliation of Pavia, speciﬁed a set of “jewels which will re-
main inalienable from the Crown, that is to say from the state, this is to say from
the nation. These jewels will become, according to the modern expression, na-
tional property.”128 Bapst emphasized that the concept of national patrimoine,
often ascribed to the Revolution, had actually been anticipated by the Valois
two hundred and ﬁfty years before.
Moreover, the collection had a critical role in brokering alliances and raising
capital when France was in the grip of crisis. In 1575, Jean Casimir, the Palatine
count, took advantage of confessional strife to maraud across France, and was
only persuaded to leave when Charles IX offered him a vast tribute and casket
of jewels. Bapst sketched the repellent swindler count returning to Germany:
It was thus he inﬂicted on France one of the greatest injuries she has ever received: re-
turning into his country, he formed a procession, driving before him herds of cows and
sheep that he had gathered in Champagne; behind him came chariots ﬁtted with plat-
forms on which were set the crown jewels, which had been given to him as a ransom,
which were displayed in a way that all the people could see them; behind them came the
hostages that he had taken from the king of France. . . . Ah, gentlemen, don’t you ﬁnd it
sad today that we have agreed to sell this collection, and that after these jewels or other
similar ones were paraded through Germany after defeat, delivering a serious insult to
126 See the letters from Edmond to Germain Bapst, BnF NAF 24525, nos. 366–418.
127 Bapst, “UCAD Conférence,” 1–2. The defense of a fortress carried particular res-
onance following the defense of Metz and Belfort in the Franco-Prussian War.
128 Ibid., 7–8.
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the French ﬂag, it is possible today for a powerful enemy to exhibit them, perhaps, in one
of his museums with this label: “Crown Jewels of France”!129
To Bapst’s dismay, the spoliation in the sixteenth century now seemed to be re-
peated at the close of the nineteenth, as the jewels became the latest trophies in
the ongoing tit-for-tat plunder between France and Germany.130 Bapst revealed
how, time and again, from the Wars of Religion to the Directory, French rulers
had raided their jewel reserves in order to raise troops and defend the nation’s
borders. This only added to the aura of the jewels, whose names triggered mem-
ories of the glorious feats of arms that they had secured on battleﬁelds like Ma-
rengo.131 Bapst shuddered to think how easily this collection, once part of the
military arsenal, could disappear across the Rhine: “Do you think the Iron
Chancellor would hesitate for a minute if, for this small sum, he could inﬂict
on our country the injury, which would especially please German pride, of ex-
hibiting in Berlin before the eyes of everyone, complete with their former label,
the diamonds of the French crown?”132
Bapst challenged the rationale of the sale on three fronts. First, he questioned
the ﬁnancial argument. By releasing so many precious jewels at once, the gov-
ernment would almost certainly depress the market and be obliged to undersell.
Echoing Énault, he queried the ﬁnancial logic of shedding a reliable source of rev-
enue, sincewhenever they had been put on show “the crowd has come, packed in,
ever renewed, ever curious, full of a naïve respect for the past, to contemplate
them.”133 Second, he pointed out the sheer incompetence that had dogged the pre-
liminary organization. Those who had lobbied for the sale had been grossly ig-
norant; Hébrad’s report to the Senate made only three factual assertions about
the jewels, and all three were false.134 The 1882 commission charged with choos-
ingwhich stones to spare from the destructionwere no better informed.A Second
Empire broach whose setting had been made by Albert Bapst, Germain’s father,
was identiﬁed in the 1884 report as “visibly a work from the era of Louis XV.”135
More shockingly, a ruby known as the “Cote de Bretagne,” originally bequeathed
by Anne de Bretagne to her daughter and designated to be worn as part of the
Collier de la Toison d’Or by Louis XV, had been dispatched to the Muséum as
129 Ibid., 61–63.
130 For German recriminations in 1870–71 about the French revolutionary-era con-
ﬁscations, see Bénédicte Savoy, Le patrimoine annexé: Les biens culturels saisis par
la France en Allemagne autour de 1800, 2 vols. (Paris, 2006), 1:285–93.
131 L’Événement, February 28, 1886; Le Rappel, February 15, 1886.
132 Germain Bapst, Histoire des joyaux de la couronne de France, d’après des doc-





a “pierre sans valeur.” It was eventually retrieved thanks to the intercession of a
Louvre curator, but when questioned, the president of the commission, Vander-
heym, confessed he had never heard of the piece.136 Third, Bapst accused the or-
ganizers of partisan spitefulness. Once the decision was announced, he and his
relatives had written to ministers offering to buy Charles X’s coronation crown,
crafted by Frédéric Bapst, planning to create a replica for the Louvre. The letters
went unanswered for months and this “historic monument” was needlessly de-
stroyed.137 Further investigations revealed that employees in the Ministry of Fi-
nances had called it a panier de salade and kicked it around like a ball. They even
fabricated little hammers to aid in the wrecking game, aiming to sell these after-
ward as memorabilia. “We believe it necessary to signal this [behavior] at a mo-
ment when the government is creating commissions, and when private societies
are being set up on all sides, to prevent the destruction of the artistic monuments
of our country.”138 By highlighting this infantile behavior, Bapst attested that the
Republic was guilty not just of negligence but of a species of vandalisme—a term
that was coined in 1793 but that carried extra bite following Hausmannization
and the Commune. After 1871, the protection of the patrimoine had acquired
the urgency of a moral crusade, and protecting historic treasures was frequently
described in terms ofﬁlial honor.139 It was disturbing to see theRepublic voting to
destroy a collection that had survived previous “decrees, thefts, pillages” and
would otherwise continue to survive “for future generations as a testimony to
the triumph of good sense over vulgarity, ignorance and stupidity.”140
Bapst also chipped away at the stones’ attributions. The initial catalogue of
the collection was regarded by many jewel experts as woefully deﬁcient.141 Of
the eight shimmering diamonds it identiﬁed as “Mazarins,” Bapst alleged that
only one (no. 4) was authentic and could be traced back to the seventeenth cen-
tury. The others were purchased during the First Empire. He ﬁrst dropped this
136 Germain Bapst, “Les joyaux de la couronne,” Revue des Deux Mondes, February,
1886, 865–66; see Claude Frégnac, “L’histoire glorieuse et la ﬁn tragique des joyaux de
la couronne,” Connaissance des Arts 122 (1962): 104.
137 Letters from Germain Bapst to Tipaigne January 6, April 8, and May 7, 1887, AN
O5/2308; letter from Charles Bapst to Tiphaigne May 11, 1887, AN O5/2308; Morel,
Les joyaux, 372.
138 Bapst, Histoire, 623–24. The organizations he has in mind include the Société de
l’histoire de l’art français (1872) and the Société des amis des monuments parisiens
(1884).
139 Tom Stammers, “Collectors, Catholics and the Commune: Heritage and Counter-
revolution,” French Historical Studies 37, no. 1 (2014): 53–87; Ruth Fiori, L’Invention
du vieux Paris: Naissance d’une conscience patrimoniale dans la capitale (Paris, 2012).
140 Bapst, “Les joyaux,” 861.
141 The head of the Chambre Syndicale, Marest, complained that the catalogue pho-
tographs gave no information about the scale of the pieces and were useless for training
artisans. Letter from Marest to the Ministère des Finances, April 8, 1887, AN O5/2308.
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bombshell during a public lecture at the Cercle Saint-Simon on March 21,
1887. One of Chaumard’s agents had been present at the talk, and he reported
back that Bapst’s revelations, once reprinted in major newspapers, would not
just dent the reputation of the Mazarins but also inspire “doubts on the value
and authenticity of other pieces or settings.”142 Bapst was indeed ruthless in
prosecuting a media campaign, recruiting society journalists as allies to his
cause and furnishing documents from the family archive that contradicted the
ofﬁcial classiﬁcation of the jewels.143 Beyond specialist periodicals such as the
Gazette des Beaux Arts, hewrote under aliases for the popular newspaper Illustra-
tion, describing in lurid terms the gruesome scenes he had witnessed in the bowels
of the Ministry of Finances in February 1887. While the wife and daughter of the
ﬁnanceminister looked on, visiblymoved, heartlessmale employees broke up the
pieces destined for the mint with pincers, hammers, and even their bare hands,
throwing the silver settings into a vase of acid.144 He even tried to persuade the
Louvre curators to change which jewels were exhibited in the vitrines of the
Galérie d’Apollon.145 Stung by accusations of ineptitude, Bloche was jolted into
publishing a new version of the catalogue in 1888, eager to correct “the embarrass-
ing impression” that its predecessor produced “among the discerning public.”146
On the offensive, Vanderheym wanted to quash any talk of “vandalism” and in-
sisted that the sale had been guided throughout by men of irreproachable “com-
petence” and “patriotism.”147 Moreover, Vanderheym queried why, if Bapst was
so devoted to the jewels, he seemed determined to do “everything possible to un-
dermine their value.” Surely his habit of throwing attributions into doubt risked
harming France’s interests?148
Yet although Bapst’s rhetorical opposition to the sale was total, it was quali-
ﬁed by recognition of its commercial advantages. He did not refrain from buying
in 1887; in the preceding weeks he escorted rich clients to inspect the lots.149 The
ﬁrm of Bapst and Falize assisted with carrying out repairs to the jewels in prep-
142 Letter from Yvan to Chaumard, March 21, 1887, AN O5/2320.
143 Letter from Bapst to Alis, December 15, 1886, BI Mss 8440 pl. 141; undated let-
ter from editor of the Revue Illustré to Bapst, BnF NAF 24531 no. 164–65; Gil Blas,
December 23, 1884.
144 X, “Les diamants de la couronne,” L’Illustration, February 19, 1887, 130–31.
The unusually precise information in this article tipped off the organizers that their con-
ﬁdences to Bapst had been betrayed. Letter from Chaumard to Tiphaigne, January 14,
1887, AN O5/2320.
145 Letter from Saglio to Bapst, December 12, 1888, BnF NAF 24539 no. 202.
146 Arthur Bloche, La vente des diamants de la couronne: Son histoire, ses preparatifs—
ses resultats, avec le catalogue raisonné des joyaux (Paris, 1888), viii.
147 Vanderheym, Notice historique, 36.
148 Ibid., 34.
149 Letter from Bapst, April 19, 1887, in reference to client M. Polontsof, AN O5/
2320.
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aration for the sale, so that these pieces could be shown in their optimal aspect.150
The publicity Bapst won through his writings enhanced his authority and he re-
ceived numerous letters asking him to authenticate family heirlooms or inter-
vene in forthcoming sales.151 He took comfort that amidst those jewels remain-
ing in the Galérie d’Apollon, several still bore the signature of his grandfather
and his father, “the reminder of an old tradition, of a former splendour, and . . .
a promise of future glory.”While he confessed his sense of “regret” and “bitter-
ness” at the way the sale had been handled, he still acknowledged hope that at
least some good might come of it if the proceeds were directed toward a grand
patriotic end. He cited as a precedent the provision in Napoleon’s will that the
600,000 francs worth of jewels from his personal collection should be invested
in pensions for those who fought in the Grande Armée, their widows, and their
descendants.152 Bapst had a fervent passion formilitary history, and especially for
that of the armies of the First Empire, whose exploits he compared to Homeric
heroes.153
The closing line of his Histoire des joyaux offered the consoling thought
that despite recent setbacks France would remain “the ﬁrst country on earth, that
which brings the beneﬁts of progress to other nations.”154 Eager to maintain that
superiority, Bapst supported the industrial policies of the Republic and was sent
on foreign tours and missions to Germany and Russia as part of his work for the
UCAD.155 Bapst thus continued to collaborate with the government, and de-
spite his spat with the regime over the sale he was proud to assist in organizing
displays—especially l’art militaire—as part of the 1889 Exposition Universelle.156
On that occasion, he had the satisfaction of seeing the ﬁrm of Bapst and Falize
praised to the skies for their historicist jewelry, including an armor-clad bust of
Gallia. The exhibition helped to vindicate the notion that private individuals
showed greater respect for French traditions than the shortsighted administra-
tion.157 Bapst had a complex relationship with the Republic, but he was willing
150 Letter from Rouvier to Kaempfen April 15, 1887, AMN M-4.
151 Letter from Dr Louge to Bapst, December 24, 1889; letter from Hunt and Roskell
to Bapst, August 10, 1894, BnF NAF 24532, nos. 286–87, 371–72.
152 Bapst, “UCADConférence,” 187. Bapst endorsed a campaign to secure Napoleon’s
bequest for the nation, although the organizer suspected that the Bapst family were
“inféodés to the cause of the Orléans princes, politically.” See letters from d’Epailly to
Bapst, March 26, 1887, and May 29, 1887, BnF NAF 9567, nos. 106, 124–25.
153 Germain Bapst, ed., Exposition historique et militaire: De la Révolution et de
l’Empire (Paris, 1895), 5.
154 Bapst, Histoire, 666, 668.
155 Order of President du Conseil to Bapst, April 7, 1887, BnF NAF 24533, no. 179.
156 See the letters from Bapst to Gervais, BnF NAF 23531.
157 See the commemorative photograph album kept at the Bibliothèque Nationale: Re-
production de plusieurs objets d’art exposés par MM Germain Bapst et Falize á l’Expo-
sition Universelle de 1889.
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to cooperate, episodically and on his own terms, to defend the national collec-
tions. This was quite different from the attitude of his one-time protégé, Édouard
Drumont, who reinterpreted the sale through an antirevolutionary and racist lens.
Fourth Facet: The Revolution and the Jews
In the course of his research Bapst had reopened the ﬁles on the notorious theft
of the jewels in September 1792. If the inventory of 1791 had placed the total
value of the collection at 30 million francs, the gang that breached the Garde-
Meuble escaped leaving only 50,000 francs’ worth of stones behind. A major
investigation was launched by the Convention, resulting in the arrest and exe-
cution of the perceived ringleaders and the recuperation of some of most cele-
brated stones following confessions and tip-offs. But who exactly had directed
this conspiracy was shrouded in mystery: as Harry Alis observed, “Nobody
wanted to believe in an ordinary theft.”158 Gaps and inconsistencies in the trial
record bred suspicion that a theft of this magnitude could only have happened
with collusion from above. In the conspiracy theory advanced by Léon Pagès,
the theft had been the brainchild of Danton and Thuriot, who had used the jew-
els to bribe the Prussians into staging the improbable defeat at Valmy. Writing
in 1877, Pagès connected the criminality of the Jacobins and the conﬁscations
of the Commune with the greater “dilapidations” perpetrated by the new regime
born on September 4.159
By contrast, Bapst in the Histoire des joyaux dispelled the more lurid rumors
and highlighted the banal aspects of the heist. He concluded that the culprits
were a gang of around thirty veteran criminals from Paris and Rouen whose
leader, Paul Miette, ﬁrst devised the plan when observing the deﬁcient security
measures at the Garde-Meuble.160 Despite his hostility toward the revolutionar-
ies—sneering that the Girondins did not speak “a word of criticism for the mas-
sacres of September”—Bapst argued that they had only indirectly encouraged
the crime through their carelessness and weak authority.161 Early reviewers of
Bapst’s monograph were thrilled by his detective work, even if they felt fa-
tigued by the detail.162 Bapst boasted that his work had superseded all previous
discussions of the theft, including that by Édouard Drumont.163 Yet Bapst’s
minimizing of Drumont concealed their earlier intimacy. In 1887, a month be-
158 Alis, “Débats du dimanche 13 février 1886,” BI Ms 8440, pl. 16–17.
159 Léon Pagès, Valmy, les diamants de la couronne de france et les dépouilles des
victims des 2 et 3 septembre, rançon de la République (Paris, 1877), 39.
160 Bapst, Histoire, 463.
161 Ibid., 553.
162 Édouard Rott, “Histoire des joyaux de la couronne,” Revue Historique 45, no. 1
(1891): 162.
163 Bapst, Histoire, 447.
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fore the sale, Bapst had encouraged readers to investigate the “remarkable and . . .
interesting work that our friend M. Edouard Drumont has published, in the Revue
de la Révolution, on the theft of 1792.”164 In turn, Drumont in 1885 frankly ac-
knowledged his gratitude to Bapst for help with sources. He urged Bapst to write
a comprehensive history of the jewels: “No publication would be more interest-
ing.”165 Quotations from Bapst appear in various places in Drumont’s rambling
La France juive as well.166 Drumont cited a letter published under the pseudonym
of Josse in the Moniteur Universel in which Bapst taunted the Minister of Fine
Arts, Antonin Proust, for choosing as the frontispiece of Revue des Arts Décoratifs
a mirror ostensibly crafted for the Renaissance beauty Louise de Vaudecourt—but
which in fact had been manufactured in 1863. A true connoisseur like Bapst knew
better than the ignorant minister, although Drumont blamed the mistake on confu-
sion spread by “parasitic and intermediary” Jewish dealers.167
Yet these friendly relations cooled in the following months, and in an undated
letter Drumont upbraided Bapst for suddenly omitting reference to Drumont
from later publications: “My dear friend, I thank you for sending your article,
but, frankly, it seems to me that it would have been simple good manners to ref-
erence the work that I published—very much thanks to you, I recognize this—in
the Revue de la Révolution. Since I have been sufﬁciently kind toward you that
you pay me back with this lack of politesse I will be obliged to do the same to
you in the same situation. Without bitterness. Ed. Drumont.”168 The reasons for
this falling out are hard to ascertain; it is possible that Bapst, who clearly had
originally aided the little-known Drumont with his polemic in 1885, was embar-
rassed after the seismic success of La France juive the following year. If Dru-
mont is to be believed, although Bapst shared some of his detestation for the
“traﬁc du Juif,” he preferred to hide his barbs under an alias.169 Bapst’s discus-
sion in the Histoire des joyaux focused on the calculations of the thieves them-
selves, not on those German and Jewish brocanteurs “indulging in an illicit
trade, in usury, and especially in the resale of stolen objects.”170 These shadowy
ﬁgures are only footnotes in a bigger conspiracy for Bapst, yet they dominated
the thinking of Drumont.
164 Bapst, “Les diamants de la couronne,” Gazette des Beaux-Arts, March 1887, 244.
La Revue de la Révolution was founded in 1883 by Charles d’Héricault and denounced
freemasonry and the centenary commemorations. See Ory, Une nation, 38.
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166 Édouard Drumont, La France juive: Essai d’histoire contemporaine, 2 vols., 43rd
ed. (Paris, 1886), 2:29.
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The fate of the jewels marked a radicalization in Drumont’s rhetorical strat-
egy and, by extension, fed into the emergence of a new strand of antisemitism at
the close of the nineteenth century. The 1885 article was the ﬁrst time that this
journalist and controversialist, previously known for his socialist sympathies
and antiquarian writings on vieux Paris, published a diatribe against the Jews.
The intellectual roots of this development predated the friendship with Bapst.
Drumont borrowed his belligerent, populist Catholicism from Louis Veuillot,
and his fullest biographer, Grégoire Kaufmann, has uncovered the critical role
played by his correspondence with Jesuit father Stanislas Du Lac.171 From Nat-
uralist literary circles and the tragedy of his mother’s insanity he developed his
obsession with poverty, victimhood, inheritance, and degeneration. Drumont’s
ﬁrst novel, Le Dernier des Trémolin, compressed the troubles of the age into the
disintegration of a single family unit.172 His early interest in collecting and in
the history of the Revolution present afﬁnities with other proponents of Natu-
ralism, such as Guy de Maupassant, Hippolyte Taine, and Edmond de Gon-
court.173 Yet the strongest literary inﬂuence on Drumont was Alphonse Daudet,
whose reputation for Provençal comedies has concealed his darker, political ob-
sessions.174 There is no better symbol of the mixed ideological heritage of Nat-
uralism than the fact that Daudet’s cofﬁn would be carried by the implacable
foes Zola and Drumont.175
It was through Daudet, indeed, that Drumont was ﬁrst sensitized to the topic
of diamonds, in a novel entitled Les Rois en exil. Published in 1879, when de-
bates on the crown jewels were just beginning, the novel had been ﬁrst con-
ceived in the wake of the destruction of the Tuileries palace. Daudet ﬂeshed out
his chronicle of royal decline by dramatizing headlines from the contemporary
salesrooms: the legal wrangling over the Toison d’Or, pawned against the honor
of the Spanish Bourbon Don Carlos; the Tattersall auction, in which the duke of
Brunswick’s carriages were bought by the Hippodrome circus; and the sale of
crowns belonging to Queen Isabel of Spain at Hôtel Drouot in 1878.176 Al-
though he had shaken off the Legitimist beliefs of his upbringing, Daudet was
171 Édouard Drumont, De l’or, de la boue, du sang: Du Panama à l’anarchie (Paris,
1896), viii; Grégoire Kauffmann, Édouard Drumont (Paris, 2008).
172 Édouard Drumont, Le Dernier des Trémolin (Paris, 1879).
173 Maupassant’s famous story about paste diamonds, “La Parure,” was written in
1880.
174 J. P. Clébert, Les Daudet: Une famille bien française (Paris, 1988).
175 Kate Cambor, Gilded Youth: Three Lives in France’s Belle Époque (New York,
2009), 158.
176 Alphonse Daudet, “Histoire de mes livres: Les Rois en exil,” in Oeuvres II (Paris,
1990), 1130, 1133. For the Spanish Bourbon jewelry sale see Catalogue des diamants
anciens, émeraudes, saphirs, rubis, perles, camées, appartenant à S.M. la reine Isabelle
de Bourbon (Paris, 1878).
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fascinated by the poignancy of such occasions, and he started to research foreign
monarchs who had fallen on hard times.177 There are at least three features of the
novel that inspired Drumont’s approach. First, Daudet wrung maximum pathos
out of the plight of exiled monarchs, but he ultimately saw their fate as irrevers-
ible; the “race” of kings was ﬁnished, living on only as a group of decrepit human
antiques.178 In a central episode in the novel, Queen Fréderique orders her servant
to dismantle the crown of Illyria, deploying garden secateurs to pluck out the
strangely animate stones: “The royalist suffered, fumed at the insult being in-
ﬂicted on the crown. He felt it shuddering, resisting, struggling.” To add to the
indignity, the dislodged stones proved on inspection to be false, a metaphor for
the imposture of royal authority.179 Second, Daudet offered a detailed depiction
of the swindles and chicaneries of the art market. Opening with the portrait of the
unscrupulous, ingenious “ﬁxer” Tom J. Lévis, whose shop is a bazaar of won-
ders, the novel delineates a “mysterious freemasonry” of dealers who rejoice in
recounting how they havemanipulated auctions, disﬁgured their stock, and duped
gullible buyers.180 Third, Les Rois en exil equated these unscrupulous commer-
cial practices with a “ghetto” of Jewish vendors who infest urban quartiers.
The Jewish dealer Père Leemans proclaims the pleasures of being a brocanteur:
“We have dealt in everything, in every period we have lived in. Everything must
come to us, pass through our hands and leave behind a bit of its skin.”181 Père
Leemans, acquirer of the ruined crown, and his seductress daughter Séphora
thrive on the misery of destitute royals (including the revealingly named Chris-
tian II).
These insights were to be recapitulated in various ways in Drumont’s writ-
ing, from the nostalgia for prerevolutionary values (shorn of any viable monar-
chist politics), the critique of cosmopolitanism, and the revulsion for Hôtel
Drouot. They surfaced most dramatically in the aforementioned 1885 article
that Drumont penned on the theft of the jewels. For Drumont, there was nothing
accidental about this incident; rather, it was an inexorable consequence of re-
publicanism:
The crown jewels did not stand a chance with the Republic. The First Republic stole one
part and let the rest be stolen. The Third Republic wants to put them up for sale. Thus is
revealed the difference between these two revolutionary movements: one, more brutal,
more instinctive, concerned on the day after the victory to lay hold immediately of the
177 Daudetmodeled his portraits on Ferdinand II of Naples, Isabel of Spain, DonCarlo,
the former prince of Orange and king of Hanover. Daudet, Oeuvres II, 1433.
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precious objects; the other, more ceremonial and more circumspect in its outward forms,
is fundamentally an organizer of cartels [syndicats]. In reality, the result is the same: ev-
erything which the monarchy saved has been wasted, for the beneﬁt of no one.182
Bapst too had discreetly contrasted the accumulative tendencies of the monar-
chy with the mindless squandering of the republics.183 But Drumont pushed fur-
ther in emphasizing that this vandalisme was intrinsic to the men of 1789 and
their heirs, who sought to “complete the work of pillage and destruction from
the Revolution.”184 He drew explicitly on Taine to indict Danton and Pétion for
their venality and corruption. The republic had been born in a culture of con-
ﬁscation: “They pillaged everywhere; they sacked the Tuileries after the 10th Au-
gust.”185 Readers need only recall the analogous behavior of the Communards in
1871 dressed as commissaires de police, “carrying out conﬁscations, breaking
into the houses and carrying off everything they could lay their hands on.”186
Drumont had limited insights into who plotted the theft, but he was keen to
stress that it was the Jews who had reaped the beneﬁts, lingering on the names
of intermediary dealers and proﬁteers called Dacosta, Lyon Rouef, Israel, Aaron
Hombergue, and Benedict Salmon. The decision to sell the jewels in 1887
should be regarded as an obvious next step for the republicans and their Jewish
accessories who had already sold off “faith, honor, the respect for ancestral glory,
ﬂawless diamonds of the human soul.” Ironically, the liquidation sale was the last
act in a drama that had already played out, disposing of external effects when the
internal assets were already lost. In imagery that anticipated but also racialized
passages in Bapst, Drumont closed with an extraordinary vision of France’s
alienated and poisoned patrimoine:
We are revolted, however, at the thought of seeing sparkle on the thickly painted ( platré)
forehead of a fashionable prostitute the diamonds that sparkled at Reims coronation day
on the robes of our Kings. We can scarcely stomach the idea of knowing that the stones
that shone out on the hilt of Napoleon’s sword under the triumphal sun at Austerlitz will
decorate the parure of some baronne of recent vintage, will serve as the futile toys
(hochets) of the wife of some German banker whose offensive fortune has been swelled
by a murderous crash. It seems that we can see in the clarity of the lustres in these di-
amonds, in the dazzling ﬁres, the blood of so many wretched suicides, of so many vic-
tims driven to despair by some shock of the stock market.187
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Drumont’s wild pairings accentuated the profanations involved; the sale was
synonymous with the victory of courtesans over the queen, of blasphemy over
Christian religion, of superﬂuous luxury over honest necessity, of vulgar parve-
nus over true aristocrats and impoverished workers, of Germany over France.188
Royal jewels metamorphosed into blood diamonds, paid for in human terms by
the catastrophic collapse of the Union Générale bank in 1882.
The debate over the diamonds, then, was the moment that crystallized many
of Drumont’s rhetorical strategies. Drumont refused to let the memory of the
sale disappear, and diamonds and gemstones return obsessively in his subse-
quent writing, as he noted that the death of the comte de Chambord heralded
the reign of the Jewish anti-Kings.189 Drumont detected usurpation everywhere,
railing against distasteful Jewish outsiders who had risen up through the jew-
elry trade like the Rothschilds and now dared to plunder the pomp of the French
crown. The French Revolution had emancipated the Jews, and no sooner had
they acquired political rights than they scrambled to appropriate furniture and
textiles hemorrhaging out from Versailles. Building on Catholic writers from
abbé Barruel to Pierre Pierrard, Drumont painted the Revolution as a “gigantic
spoliation” from which only the Jews had proﬁted.190 Disguised in the colors
and the costumes of previous generations, the Jewish aristocracy were no better
than simulacres, false jewels rather than the genuine article.191 Drumont noted
that the chateaux fringing Paris had one by one been devoured by Jewish propri-
etors. The forest of Champrosay, where hismentorDaudet had lived, had become
“a semitic ﬁef ” after the Cahen d’Anvers banking dynastymoved in and reprised
the monstrous inequalities of feudalism. “While [Monsieur] Cahen hunts in the
forests that once saw the elegant cavalcades of the 18th century, Mme Cahen
drapes herself in the jewels that belonged to previous queens and princesses, with
the poor taste of the parvenu.” She even had the insensitivity to parade a pearl
necklace once commissioned by Napoleon while paying a visit to Bonaparte’s
descendant, the Princesse Mathilde.192 What was happening at Champrosay
was replicated in every grand house:
The eyes of all the French are opening bit by bit; they see what the Revolution has led to;
they notice Jews vomited out from all the ghettos, installed now as masters in historic
chateaux that evoke the most glorious memories of old France; they ﬁnd Rothschilds
188 Ibid., 43.
189 Édouard Drumont, La ﬁn d’un monde: Étude psychologique et sociale (Paris,
1892), 392. For diamond references, see Drumont, France juive, I, 19, 20, 40, 44, 60,
98, 118, 119, 129, 143, 144, 234; II, 124, 136, 161, 277.
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everywhere: Ferrières and at Vaux-de-Cernay, in the abbey founded by Blanche of
Castille; they ﬁnd Hirsch at Marly, in the place of Louis XIV; Ephrussi at Fontainebleau,
in the place of François I; the Dreyfus of dung (guano) at Pont-Chartrain. Walking along
our long avenues, they notice that the most magniﬁcent hôtels are occupied by Jews, and
that each of these dwellings speaks of a theft, a fraud, a pouf, a crash, a bankruptcy, a run
on the stock exchange, miseries and suicides.193
Drumont’s perspective was not narrowly French but drew frequently on exam-
ples of patrimonial dissolution elsewhere in Europe. If Daudet had been drawn
to the humiliation of the Spanish Bourbons, Drumont meditated on the suffer-
ings of Empress Elizabeth of Hapsburg, thrown onto the mercy of the Viennese
Rothschilds.194 He took a keen interest in the Jew-baiting debates in the Austrian
parliament, where the deputy for Styria warned that Austria might follow the
terrible example of France and sell the crown jewels to ruthless Jewish mag-
nates. As in Paris, so too in Vienna, Europe’s liberal elites were locked in a dance
around the Golden Calf.195
In his classic study of antisemitism as an ideology, Stephen Wilson noted
Drumont’s views that Jews were the enemy of patrimony (“that is, all legitimate
and durable property”) and his obsession with the vanishing of “Old France.”
Echoing Sartre, Wilson speculates that such “anti-Semitic attachment to histor-
ical France can be interpreted as a claim of ‘ownership’ over it, and thereby to a
status that is impregnable because it is inherited and not achieved.”196 It should
be added that Drumont’s bid for ownership over a generic French past (encom-
passing St Louis, Henri IV, and Napoleon) coexisted with an intense combat for
speciﬁc historic monuments that seemed in jeopardy. Drumont’s writing on the
jewels integrated his earlier antiquarian research into the material traces of the
ancien régime with the totalizing vision of modern cultural pollution outlined in
La France juive. Historians have long noted the ubiquity of patrimonial meta-
phors of heredity, lineage, descent, and dispersal in right-wing thought.197 But
these tropes gained potency when enlisted for well-publicized struggles over
French historic property, seemingly menaced by political, economic, and cul-
tural outsiders. The controversy over the crown jewels represents an early in-
stance of how the discourse of national heritage—brandished by republicans
and liberals in the 1820s and 1830s to denounce the scourge of démolisseurs
and la bande noire—was by the 1870s and 1880s deployed against the cynical
193 Drumont, De l’or, de la boue, vi.
194 Frederick Busi, The Pope of Anti-Semitism: The Career and Legacy of Edouard-
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republican order.198 Bapst’s and Drumont’s intervention foreshadowed later ini-
tiatives from conservatives and the Radical Right—including André Hallays,
Charles Maurras, and Maurice Barrès—to mobilize public opinion behind le
patrimoine en danger.199
History under the Hammer
Against a backdrop of gloomy predictions in the newspapers, the sale took
place inMay 1887. In the fortnight beforehand the jewels were once again exhib-
ited and attracted signiﬁcant crowds; Bloche estimated as many as six thousand
visitors a day came to bid farewell, while Tiphaigne thought that twenty-ﬁve
thousand people surged in during the days prior to the sale.200 The walls of the
Pavillon de Flore were decked out with tapestries from the Garde-Meuble illus-
tratingmythical heroes and tragic heroines. The reporter for Illustrationmarveled
at an unexpected effect of the mise-en-scène: “By a singular coincidence, they
[the tapestries] are topped by bundles of tricolor ﬂags whose cartouches with
the letters R.F. are placed immediately above the shields of the royal house of
France.” In this powerful symbolism, the ﬂeur-de-lis was subordinate to the tri-
color, and republican deputies sat on the spot where Eugénie had formerly
opened parliament.201 The sale enacted an exorcism of the monarchical tradition.
One observer compared the disappearance of the jewels to the scattering of rose
petals or laurel leaves, hoping implicitly that they might one day ﬂower again.202
Énault saluted the jewels “whose name is imperishable, and which, even after
their dispersal, will always be called the Diamonds of the Crown!”203 Bapst de-
scribed the ghostly ofﬁcial photographs in the catalogue as “efﬁgies of souve-
nirs,” remnants of a lost love affair. He was right that the plates within Michel
Berthaud’s album successfully showed off the brilliance of the merchandise
but also had a solemn, commemorative quality (ﬁg. 2).204 Even among those
unsentimental presiding ofﬁcers at the sale, the gravity of the occasion was af-
fecting. Vanderheym reported that in watching the jewels being led to their ﬁnal
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Fig. 2.—“Diadèmes de turqoise.” Photograph by Michel Berthaud. Diamants de la
couronne de France (Paris, 1887), plate 3. Bibliothèque Nationale de France. Source:
Bibliothèque Nationale de France. Color version available as an online enhancement.
resting place in the vitrines, “we experienced a feeling analogous to that one feels
when attending the deposition of a corpse. Everything conspired to give the scene
the appearance of a funeral ceremony.”205
However valedictory, the sale was also a grand social occasion, “a Parisian
event, if ever there was [one].”206 The “Gotha of Europe” ﬂocked as potential
bidders, and the auction marked a climax to a decade of exceptional jewelry
sales, including those of Nélie Jacquemart and Marie Blanc.207 Prestigious jew-
elers took commissions on behalf of the European courts: Garrard, jewelers to
Queen Victoria, competed against Friedburg, supplier of Württemberg, and
Bachruch, who served the Hapsburgs in Budapest. Despite their reservations
about the sale, French dealers were determined not to miss out, and they too
turned out en masse, including Boucheron, Rouvenat, Hamelin, Briquet, Meyer,
Seligman, Ochs, Guillemin, Lowenstein, Michel Ephrussi, Noury, Levi frères,
and of course Bapst ﬁls.208 The collision of foreign rivals, high society, govern-
ment dignitaries, and ogling crowds proved irresistible to reporters from across
the continent. Paul Eudel noted that journalists hurried to describe the luster
of the event, “down to the smallest detail of its physiognomy.”209 Every aspect
of the event was historic, and hence collectible; one English eccentric apparently
paid 5,000 francs for the hammers that had been used to break up ancient rega-
lia.210 International buyers made the most specular purchases: Garrard bought a
diadem at 180,000 francs for the Prince of Wales; the mysterious baron de Horn
spent nearly a million francs to “reconstruct in India a vitrine for the French
crown”; and the American jeweler Louis Comfort Tiffany acquired four of
the seven so-calledMazarins.211 The sale cemented the reputation for discerning
luxury Tiffany had won at the 1878 exhibition and conﬁrmed his alliance with
millionaire American clients such as the Pulitzers and the Stanfords; the New
York Herald headline crowed triumphantly, “Tiffany takes the cake!”212 By Sep-
tember, with all bids counted, the sale was reckoned to have raised 7,097,665
francs.213
By anatomizing the sale into its constituent parts, we can grasp the jarring
conceptions of value that were projected onto the jewels. The 1887 sale testiﬁes
to the composite nature of French heritage politics and its reliance on recalci-
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trant elements, unpredictable events, and volatile markets. Each group—politi-
cians, bureaucrats, scholars, dealers, and journalists—had turned the sale to
their own advantage. The French state was ﬂush with a new source of funds,
but hopes for a new Caisse des Musées were thwarted by years of inaction
and indecision.214 Tiphaigne and Chaumard congratulated themselves that ev-
erything went relatively smoothly, and even Jules Marest, head of the Chambre
Syndicale, expressed gratitude for how the administration had proceeded.215 As
for Bapst, he had the satisfaction of seeing his reattributions vindicated on sev-
eral occasions. For instance, the wealthy American Mrs. Suzanne Gall thought
she had acquired the “Miroir de Portugal” diamond, when in reality it was a
stone bought for Napoleon by Nitot in 1810.216 In his letters to Tiphaigne point-
ing out such embarrassing facts, Bapst signed off with the title “lauréat de
l’Académie Fr & de l’Académie des Inscriptions.”217 Bapst’s corrections were
not just sweet revenge; they were also demonstrations of the superior science
possessed by the scholar and art lover (amateur) over the philistine ofﬁcial.Mean-
while Drumont seized on the sale as proof that the republican propensity for van-
dalism in the 1790s had not been cured but only redirected, and he warned that the
collection would be degraded in unworthy, foreign hands. The auction marked
the inception of Drumont’s antisemitic campaign, and it allowed him to implant
the defense of French heritage at its core.218
These disputes over expertise between individuals paralleled conﬂicting deﬁni-
tions of heritage itself. Conservatives drew upon a notion of patrimony strongly
informed by juridical and familial understandings: historic objects were a bequest
from the dead to their descendants and had to be preserved with care so that this
property could be passed on undivided. Jules Laforgue mocked the reactionary
collector who might buy one of these jewels but was revolted at the thought of
wearing it, since to do so would be a profanation.219 Conversely, republicans cel-
ebrated their dynamic, productive, and potentially transformative stewardship of
past treasures. A report from deputy Trouillot in 1895 defended “democratic re-
gimes” from accusations of indifference toward France’s treasures, since it was
republican governments that ﬁrst “saw something beyond a means of entertain-
ment and an object of curiosity, and understood the true educational mission.”220
In opting for a selection (triage) of the best jewels, in subjecting the stones to sci-
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entiﬁc investigation at the Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle, in exhibiting national
treasures in order to aid industrial education—in sum, in enlisting the resources
of the past for the needs and beneﬁt of the future—the men of the Third Republic
upheld protocols originally created by the Convention.
As so often in the scandal-ridden Third Republic, deliberations previously
conducted within a narrow circle spilled out to become a media affaire.221 The
sale occupied newspaper column inches for nearly a decade, from the ﬁrst vote
on alienation in 1878 through to the momentous 1887 sale. One writer in Le Vol-
taire complained that the issue threatened to “go on forever” and was relieved
that in May France would be “ﬁnally rid of ” the jewels.222 Thanks to this long
exposure, and the sharply contrasting positions, the sale generated an unusually
wide-ranging if not well-informed discussion. For Émile Blavet, the sale “has un-
leashed lively controversies. It has its passionate enemies and convinced parti-
sans.”223 Blustering through the technicalities, journalists focused more on what
the sale meant for French identity at a time of economic recession, political up-
heaval, and grumblings about decadence. The ensuing fears and resentments
were ventriloquized by novelists and journalists, who translated the legislative
debates into the idiom of a family melodrama or the scenario from a Naturalist
novel.224 If the jewels were valued by Énault and Bapst less as royal decorations
than as national assets, Drumont pictured France as a house stripped of its con-
tents, losing in swift succession not only its valuables but also “all the relics of the
past, everything that spoke to the soul, everything that recalled the life of the an-
cestors. The Rothschilds began by emptying the drawers, tearing down the cru-
ciﬁx; the Jews Vanderheym and Bloche have been commissioned, on the initia-
tive of Lockroy, to sell the diamonds of the Crown.”225
The timing of the sale coincided with a period of exceptional transition in
politics, in the arts, and in the relationship between the two.226 The salesroom
is a vital arena for historians seeking to understand these transitions, framing
the high-stake luttes paciﬁques in which different nations and political camps
went head to head. The 1887 debate on jewels was followed only two years later
by the furor over Millet’s Angélus at the Secrétan sale, leading to a highly pub-
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licized tussle between French ministers (especially Antonin Proust) and a con-
sortium of American collectors.227 The year 1889 also saw the subscription cam-
paign launched by Monet to purchase Manet’s Olympia for the Luxembourg,
alarmed at the “predicted departure for another continent of so many works of
art that are the joy and the glory of la France.”228 Four years on and the Spitzer
sale again exposed how auctions dredged up revolutionary memories, adminis-
trative ineptitude, and antisemitic slanders.229 Of course, due to the transnational
character of the art market, related frictions emerged elsewhere in Europe. Brit-
ain in the 1880s and 1890s witnessed the heyday of “auction fever” and “picture
mania”—especially after the Settled Lands Act and the introduction of death du-
ties in 1894 led to heated debate over the dismantling of its country house col-
lections.230 The aesthete J. C. Robinson protested in 1895 that Germany was
“robbing us of the very springs and bases of connoisseurship, the noble art trea-
sures which our fathers and grandfathers endowed us with, while we waste our
money on second-rate curiosities only, or worthless trash.”231 Yet the Germany
of Wilhelm von Bode, feared as unstoppable in France and Britain, was con-
vulsed with its own collecting malaise. Beth Irwin has demonstrated how the ex-
pansion of a middle-class public reading about and investing in art fed into a
backlash in the 1890s against difﬁcult “cosmopolitan” experiments (linked to
the Berlin Secession and Jewish inﬂuence).232
Such shrill, defensive, xenophobic voices were integral to emerging discourses
about patrimony in many European states.233 Nonetheless, these discourses ac-
quired a singular bitterness in France due to both the ideological fervor that
had been injected into heritage debates since 1789 and the centrality accorded
to (gendered) norms of taste as an index of French citizenship and distinction.234
Most fundamental was the dissonance between normative ideas of state heritage
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jurisdiction and the openness of France to international commerce. Paris re-
mained throughout the nineteenth century the hub of the market in ﬁne and dec-
orative arts, and French tastes set the tone across Europe and North America. For
some, the global dissemination of masterpieces by the nation’s artists and crafts-
men was a salutary form of cultural imperialism, helping to civilize backward
neighbors. Indeed, the republican argument for making the patrimoine produc-
tive was predicated on the ability to dispose of France’s cultural surplus through
market channels. Yet boasts of grandeur oscillated with jeremiads of decline, as
others equated the business of the salesrooms with the corrosive features of mo-
dernity, in which iconoclastic democracy and mercenary global capitalism con-
spired to expatriate France’s ancestral possessions.
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